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Taxing Tourism in Spain: Results and Recommendations 
Summary 
This paper analyses the foundations, possible applications and the effects of tourism 
taxation in Spain. The article begins with an analysis of the economic and 
environmental reasons for taxing tourism, which would seem to call for taxes based on 
the principle of benefit, for either revenue or corrective purposes. Subsequently, we 
describe the praxis of tourism taxation in Spain, with special mention being given to the 
now repealed Balearic ecotasa. Finally, the effects of two fiscal modifications with 
revenue or corrective objectives are studied through the use of an applied general 
equilibrium model developed for the Spanish economy. We thus see that a 10% tax on 
lodging brings in significant public receipts, increases social welfare and has no effect 
on the environment. On the other hand, an increase of VAT rates on tourism-related 
sectors could have the same effects on tourist expenditure but at the costs of greater 
impact for Spain’s economy.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In recent decades tourism has become a primary economic activity of many countries, 
with Spain as a good example in the developed world. If the economic benefits of 
tourism are clear (more added value and employment, for example), the various costs 
derived from it are also evident (congestion, environmental degradation, etc.). This 
makes public regulation of tourist activity a necessity, and such regulation must 
pursue a certain balance, not always easy to reach, in order to attain the maximum 
net social benefit over time. 
 
Among the public policies affecting the tourism sector, taxation plays an especially 
important role. This is due, first of all, to the magnitude of the potential revenue in 
terms of the fiscal system and its high degree of social acceptability. Secondly, its 
importance is linked to its capacity to act as the substitute of a price for the public 
goods and services consumed by tourists. Finally, there is the corrective (e.g. 
environmental) role that these taxes can be given. 
 
For those or other reasons, in recent years many countries have introduced a wide 
range of taxes on tourism. In particular, some relevant attempts have already been 
made in Spain and new proposals are to be expected in the next few years. Therefore, 
given the importance of the Spanish tourism industry and of the efficiency and 
distributional effects generally associated to taxation, a comprehensive analysis 
should be carried out on the possibilities and consequences of such policy option. This 
paper proposes to carry out this analysis through an Applied General Equilibrium 
Model (AGEM), quite a useful method to deal with these issues but scarcely employed 
in the literature so far. 
 
The structure of the article is as follows. First of all, the foundations underlying the 
taxation of tourism are analyzed (section 2) to continue with the description of some 
practical applications in Spain (section 3). Section 4 shows the main characteristics of 
the AGEM for the Spanish economy used in this exercise. The following section 
presents and discusses the simulation results of two hypothetical tax measures   3
affecting tourism: the introduction of a tax on lodging and the increase of Value Added 
Tax (VAT) rates levied on tourism-related sectors. Finally, section 6 deals with the 
main conclusions and recommendations.  
 
 
2. Foundations of tourism taxation   
 
The tourism sector has grown in importance in recent decades, and is expected to keep 
on growing around 4-5% per year in the next 50 years (WTO, 1998). Today it 
represents around 10% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and investment 
worldwide, obviously being much higher in small tourist economies. This data explains 
why an activity that has traditionally benefited from low fiscal pressure has now 
become an important field of action for the fiscal systems of many countries. In fact, 
tax receipts generated by tourism commonly represent more than 10% of the tax 
revenue collected by some developed countries, and this figure can approach 100% in 
certain small tourist economies (McAleer, Shareef and Da Veiga, 2005). 
 
As it will be seen in the following section, tourist activity has been used as a taxable 
item in accordance with a wide range of formulas and circumstances (see WTO, 1998, 
for details). However, none of these formulas can be described strictly as tourism 
taxes, since nearly all goods and services used by tourists (hotels, restaurants, flights, 
car renting, etc.) are also used by non-tourists. Thus the taxable item is not the 
tourism but rather a tax base roughly linked to it, so that any fiscal measure 
addressed to tourism activities has also effects on non-tourists. Consequently, when 
we refer to tourism taxation in this paper we really mean taxes affecting tourist 
activities. 
 
Having in mind this limitation, the following paragraphs deal with the foundations of 
tourism taxation, which can be summarized in three aspects: i) revenue objectives 
(which are implicitly tax reform objectives), ii) coverage of conventional costs of public 
services and iii) internalization of external costs. With regard to the first question, a   4
tourism sector with a high specific weight in the economy is a natural candidate for, at 
least, average fiscal pressure (derived from tax policies not focused on tourism), but 
also for higher pressure than average (derived from deliberate tax policies on tourism). 
The reason for the latter is twofold: the low distortionary effects of this kind of 
taxation and the exportability of the fiscal burden. 
 
It is well known that a tourism tax distorts when demand is relatively elastic, since 
the price differential caused by the tax leads to a significant change in behavior. 
Traditionally it has been considered that many tourist destinations have no clear 
substitutes (for particular geographical or climatic reasons, distance, quality, etc.), 
which creates monopoly power in the supply side (see e.g. Gooroochurn and Sinclair, 
2005) and also means that price alterations may bring about minor changes in the 
demand side (low elasticities). This situation could lead to use tourism taxes not only 
for an easy and efficient collection of revenues from an inelastic base, but also as a 
way to correct the undesirable effects of market power. Nevertheless, the available 
data indicates that countries in this situation do not tax tourism more intensely.  
 
Anyway, in recent years price elasticities have increased in some tourist regions 
mainly due to the incorporation of new countries to tourism markets. This could be the 
case of the Mediterranean region, where countries like Spain, Italy, Greece, Croatia, 
Turkey, Egypt, Tunis or Morocco compete nowadays in the same market acting like 
substitutes. But even when changes in prices bring about distortions in behavior, if 
the tax incidence falls mainly on the tourist (not on the party offering the tourism 
service) and the tourist is not a resident (that is, there is tax exportability), the excess 
burden disappears in the minds of policy makers (Gooroochurn and Sinclair, 2003). 
According to the empirical evidence the preceding hypotheses are plausible and thus 
the taxing of tourism becomes more attractive in terms of fiscal reform (see e.g. Fuji, 
Khaled and Mak, 1985). Nevertheless, this only applies when tourists are not 
residents in the jurisdiction that levies the tax. This means that exportability of 
central taxes only works if tourists are foreign, whereas for regional or local taxes 
would be enough if tourists come from outside the jurisdiction that levies the tax.   5
 
A second reason for using these instruments is the specific funding of tourism-related 
overcosts brought about by a higher provision of public goods and services. Here the 
tax would act as a price theoretically guided by the principle of benefit and, if the 
aforementioned overcosts are not covered, it would cause an extra fiscal burden to non-
tourist taxpayers. For example, an intensive tourist activity may lead to the need for 
larger supply of services or infrastructures, such as citizen security or sanitation 
services, whose costs may not be covered by taxes paid by tourists. But in less 
intensive tourists regions it is possible that no additional infrastructures or services 
are needed (e.g. normal levels of citizen security and sanitation services will be 
sufficient), so the opposite may apply: revenue of taxes paid by tourists may be higher 
than the costs of the few public services used by them. 
 
Finally, the external costs resulting from tourist activity may be important (Green, 
Hunter and Moore, 1990). Basically, this area includes environmental costs and 
congestion, which are not only a by-product of the tourism sector but also an input of 
its production function. Therefore, public intervention is especially urgent and can be 
achieved through taxation (see Clarke and Ng, 1993), as economic efficiency will be 
restored when a corrective tax leads to the inclusion of environmental and congestion 
(external) costs in the final price of the tourism package. In addition, the effect of the 
tax on the quality of tourism supply can be significant and this directly affects the 
tourists’ willingness to pay and so the magnitude of the added value by the sector. 
Furthermore, the tax can be used with a variable time profile to avoid congestion 
peaks and de-seasonalize tourism activities. However, recalling the impossibility of 
taxing tourism directly, corrective tax measures will usually affect other agents and 




                                                           
1 In fact, efficiency and equity considerations suggest that a discriminatory treatment of tourists should 
be avoided: when using corrective taxes, all agents that cause external costs must be liable to them.    6
3. Tourism taxation in Spain 
 
As already stated, the tourism sector faces conventional or general taxation on 
economic activity and also a set of specific taxes. In the case of conventional taxation 
this sector may be subject to higher rates (e.g. in general sales and income taxes), even 
though the administrative costs associated to this option make it less attractive from a 
practical point of view. Specific taxation generally takes the form of taxes on lodging, 
which are very common in the fiscal practices of both developed and developing 
countries. 
 
In the case of Spain general (central) taxation on the Spanish tourism sector is usually 
below average, perhaps due to the difficulty of distinguishing between tourists and 
non-tourists (see Blake, 2000). At the same time, there is a growing interest in the 
application of specific (regional) taxes on tourist activities. In a setting where Spanish 
legislation allows rather meager regional tax baskets, this phenomenon is probably 
related to the high exportability and revenue collection capacity of such taxes for some 
Spanish regions (Gago et al., 2006). 
 
For example, this is clearly the case of two regional taxes introduced by the Balearic 
government: the now repealed ecotasa (literally: eco-tax; however, as explained later, 
the spirit of the true eco-tax is very different from the one of the Balearic project) and 
the recently announced tax on rented cars2. The ecotasa charged stays at hotel 
establishments, the taxpayer being the visitor who paid for the nights at the hotel, 
with a fixed amount per night for the length of the hotel stay (although it varied 
according to the type and category of the establishment). Tax receipts were earmarked 
to a fund that was to finance actions aimed at improving tourist activity and 
preserving the environment (Palmer and Riera, 2003).  
 
                                                           
2 Though still a project, the tax on rented cars would include a fixed daily payment (between 4.5 and 5 
euro depending on cubic capacity) and a variable payment depending on the mileage (between 0.02 and 
0.03 euro also depending on cubic capacity). It is still difficult to carry out a proper analysis of the tax, 
albeit it will probably bring about larger effects than the ecotasa.   7
At a first sight, the ecotasa seemed to combine some of the above-mentioned objectives: 
revenue collection and coverage of costs. Moreover, it could allow for a strategic action 
on the market in that its deterrent effects could be concentrated in the wholesale 
packages that target middle-lower incomes, the least desirable segment and the one 
with the lowest added value. However, its environmental nature was clearly 
questionable, as it could only have favorable environmental effects through a 
quantitative reduction and/or qualitative modification of tourism (Gago and 
Labandeira, 2001).  
 
Indeed, the traditional definition of environmental tax requires that it have a clear 
and direct relationship with a specific environmental problem to punish the harmful 
behavior that the tax hopes to modify (see section 2). Obviously, the linkage between 
the use of accommodation and environmental damage is rather imperfect so the 
ecotasa fails in this aspect. Despite the insistence of some commentators, earmarking 
the revenue obtained from a tax to environmental ends does not make it an 
environmental tax either. Besides, in normal conditions environmental receipts should 
not be earmarked for environmental expenditure because doing so conditions those 
policy programs to the eventualities of tax resources and thus may cause over or under 
provision of environmental protection.  
 
 
4. The methodology to simulate policy reforms 
 
The tourism sector contributes significantly to Spanish GDP, so taxing this activity 
could have important effects not only on the tourism sector, but also on the rest of the 
economy. Empirical studies on tourism taxation have been usually carried out under 
partial equilibrium approaches (e.g. Gooroochurn and Sinclair, 2005), but a general 
equilibrium approach is more appropriate to capture the global effect of a particular 
tax policy. A partial equilibrium approach will analyze only the direct effects on the 
specific sectors studied. However, that approach will be inappropriate when the 
specific sectors analyzed have a significant contribution to the economy. For instance,   8
a tax reform that affects the activity of the Spanish tourism sector could have 
important consequences in the labor market and in other sectors like construction. 
Few studies have been carried out using this approach (among them, Blake, 2000; 
Jensen and Wanhill, 2002), so this paper tries to give a new contribution in this field.  
 
AGEMs are used in economic research to simulate the macroeconomic conditions of a 
country, region or the world. The name of this methodology refers to the fact that the 
model contains all markets of an economy (goods, services, factors, etc.) with different 
degrees of aggregation, which have to be in equilibrium. They combine a mathematical 
description of the economic relationship between sectors (domestic industry, foreign 
markets) and institutions (government, households, external sector) with data from 
national accounts. This section describes the methodology used to fulfill the objectives 
of this paper. A more technical description of the AGEM is presented in the Appendix 
and Labandeira, Labeaga and Rodríguez (2006). 
 
The model presented here is designed for a small open economy with seventeen 
productive sectors. It is a static model because the simulation is carried out for a 
specific year. Yet firms and households can react to any external stimulus, such as 
increased prices, through the use elasticities of substitution that allow for endogenous 
behavior in the model. 
 
Following the disaggregation of the Spanish national accounts, there are three 
institutional sectors in the economy: a representative household, the public sector and 
the external sector. Production in each sector is a combination of materials and the 
remaining productive factors (K, L, energy). Total supply of good i in the economy is a 
composite good of national production and imports, which are considered imperfect 
substitutes. The final destination of the supply is the export market and the domestic 
market.  
 
On the one hand, the public sector collects taxes on income, consumption and 
production, payroll taxes (paid by employers) and a tourist tax that is initially zero. It   9
also obtains capital income, makes net transfers with other institutions and consumes 
goods and services. The result is a public budget in deficit and financed with the 
savings of other institutions. On the other hand, the representative household has a 
fixed amount of time that can be devoted to the consumption of leisure or to supply 
labor. It obtains income from both labor and capital, makes transfers with other 
institutions and pays various taxes3. Its objective is to maximize its welfare according 
to its budgetary restrictions. The welfare function depends positively on the 
consumption of leisure, goods and services.  
 
The model assumes a small open economy that exchanges goods and services with 
other economies and makes net transfers. Furthermore non-resident households in 
Spain (mainly tourism) consume also goods and services. Exports and imports allow 
for equilibrium in the balance of payments. The macroeconomic equilibrium is 
determined by the economy’s capacity or need for financing with regard to the exterior 
(exogenous variable), which is equal to the difference between the national savings 
(defined endogenously by each of the institutions) and investments. The model also 
assumes that domestic markets of goods and factors are perfectly competitive, with no 
involuntary unemployment. Capital and labor supplies are perfectly mobile among 
sectors but are immobile internationally, although the capital supply is inelastic. 
 
The database comes from a National Accounting Matrix for the Spanish economy 
(NAM-95), constructed upon the basis of national accounts for the year 1995 and 
published by the Spanish Institute of Statistics (INE, 2002). Table A1 in the Appendix 
depicts the fields of activity used for the purposes of this study and their 
correspondence with other statistical classifications. Moreover, the NAM-95 has been 
enlarged with data from the Satellite Accounts of Tourism in Spain for the year 1996 
(SAT-96) and published in INE (2001). In particular, we use the expenditure shares of 
non residents in the SAT-96 to calculate their equivalence in the NAM-95, which only 
includes the total amount of purchases by non residents in 1995. The SAT-96 has eight 
                                                           
3 The representative household does not provide (sell) goods and services to the economy, with the 
exception of labor. 
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characteristic goods associated to tourist activities and two other goods (Table A2 in 
Appendix). Tourist characteristic goods have been aggregated following the sectors in 
the NAM-95, whereas the other goods were disaggregated in food and beverages, 
chemical products and other manufactures by assuming the same shares on 
expenditure as Spanish households. 
 
Based on the NAM-95 data, the parameters of the model are calibrated: tax rates, 
technical coefficients of the production functions, consumption and utility. The 
criterion used is that the AGEM be capable of reproducing the data of the NAM-95 as 
an optimal solution or equilibrium, which will be used as a benchmark. In the initial 
equilibrium prices are equal to the unit, with the effects of the reforms being 
estimated as relative changes in the production and the relative prices. Certain 
parameters, such as the elasticities of substitution, were not calibrated but were 
rather taken from other studies4. 
 
 
5. Simulating the effects of some tourism taxes in Spain 
 
Given the importance of the Spanish tourism sector and the role that could be played 
by the taxation of this activity, this section deals with the effects of two taxes with 
effects on tourism. As mentioned above, it is not possible to strictly talk about tourist 
taxes, but some tax reforms with an a priori special effect on tourism activities can be 
defined. Two alternative tax policies are analyzed through the AGEM model for the 
Spanish economy, with the revenue obtained being fully refunded to the citizens by 
means of lump-sum transfers. 
 
First, the implementation of an ad valorem tax on hotel occupancy is considered. 
There are three reasons for choosing this tax: (i) lodging taxes are one of the more 
                                                           
4 The wage elasticity of labor supply was calibrated to -0.4, similar to that estimated for Spain by Labeaga 
and Sanz (2001). Price elasticity of the total expenditure made by non-resident consumers in Spain was 
calibrated to -1.73, in accordance with the estimates obtained for Andalusia in Lozano, Morales and 
Navarro (2000).    11
used ways to tax tourists, especially in small tourist economies (McAleer et al., 2005), 
(ii) among taxes affecting tourism, at least in tourist regions, this is perhaps the one 
which has a better connection with tourism, and (iii) it is an easy way to allow for 
different levels of taxation for different lodging categories. 
 
The simulated tax is considerably more potent than the Balearic ecotasa, and it is paid 
by non-resident consumers (basically, incoming tourist consumption). Unfortunately, 
the database used in this study does not disaggregate the expenditure on restaurants 
and lodging. As the latter represents approximately 35% of the total outlay (INE, 
2001), and the purpose is to simulate a tax rate of 10% on the expenditure for lodging, 
the tax rate finally used is 3.5% of on the expenditure in both groups of goods.  
 
Secondly, the effects of a rise in VAT rates applied on the consumption on tourism-
related sectors (hotels, restaurants, cafes, bars and similar services) are analyzed. The 
reason for this simulation is that in Spain reduced VAT rates (7%) are applied, which 
contrasts with the widespread application of higher rates in other European countries 
and with the initiatives by the European Commission to considerably limit reduced 
VAT rates within five years. Therefore, two changes in VAT rates are considered: a 
moderate increase from 7% to 12%, and an ambitious reform raising the VAT of these 
services to the general rate in Spain (16%).  
 
 
5.1. Effects of a tourist tax on lodging 
 
The impact of this tax on the economy as a whole is not significant, in terms of either 
the GDP or employment. There are not also significant variations in prices, capital or 
labor income. Perhaps most noteworthy is the limited effect of the tax on the activity 
of the hotel and restaurant sector (HOST), which falls only slightly, by -0.8% (see 
Table 1). As a consequence, there is also a small reduction on employment in this 
sector, by a -0.9%. Despite this, the tourist tax is able to generate a tax yield for the 
government of about 359 million Euros.   12
 
Table  1. Changes (%) on production and real prices 
Tax on lodging  VAT 12%  VAT 16% 
  Production  Pi  Production  Pi  Production  Pi 
AGRICULTURE  0,00  0.00   0.20  - 0.20   0.30  - 0.30 
MINERY   0.17  0.00   0.12  - 0.10   0.20  - 0.10 
ENERGY   0,09  0.00   0.04  - 0.20   0.13  - 0.22 
FOOD  - 0.10  0.00  - 0.20  - 0.10  - 0.50  - 0.20 
MANUFACTURES  0.19  0.00   0.31  - 0.10   0.57  - 0.11 
CONSTRUCTION  0.00  0.00  - 0.20  - 0.10  - 0.30  - 0.10 
SERVICES 1   0.10  0.00   0.20  - 0.10   0.40  - 0.20 
HOTEL & REST.  - 0.80  0.00  - 2.90   3.50  - 5.70   7.00 
TRANSPORT  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.10  0.00 
SERVICES 2   0.10  0.00   0.20 0.00  0.30  0.00 
CPI  -- 
0.00  --   0.50  --   0.90 

























FOOD  1,209  1,194  - 1.25  1,194  - 1.25  1,179  - 2.49 
MANUFACTURES 1,930  1,905  - 1.29  1,904  - 1.32  1,880  - 2.57 
SERVICES 1  1,416  1,398  - 1.27  1,398  - 1.27  1,381  - 2.50 
HOTEL & REST.  10,754  10,259  - 4.60  10,247  - 4.71  9,781  - 9.05 
TRANSPORT  2,915  2,878  - 1.27  2,875  - 1.35  2,837  - 2.67 
SERVICES 2  956  944  - 1.27  942  - 1.39  930  - 2.72 
TOTAL   19,178  18,577  - 3.14  18,560  - 3.22  17,986  - 6.22 
CPINR  --  -- 
1.90 
-- 
2.00  --  9.00 
              Source: the authors.  
Notes: CPINR is the relative change in the CPI for non-resident consumers. 
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Table 2 shows that the most significant effects are felt by non-resident consumers. In 
general, the consumption of goods and services falls by -1.3% approximately that in 
the case of hotel and restaurant services is equal to a -4.6% decrease. As a result, non-
resident consumers reduce their total expenditure in Spain by around -3.1% in 
response to the 1.9% increase in the prices of their consumption basket in Spain. In 
spite of its limited economic consequences, the effects on social welfare of the tourist 




5.2. Effects of a moderate rise in VAT rates 
 
A moderate increase in VAT applied to hotels, restaurants and similar services, is also 
simulated by increasing tax rates by approximately 67% from the actual reduced tax 
rate (7%) to 12%. The results show that this reform will have a modest effect on the 
economy with a reduction in the real GDP at market prices around -0.2%. As a 
consequence, there would be no significant effects on aggregated employment levels 
that only drop slightly by -0.2%. Changes on capital and labor income would be 
however more important, -0.5% and -0.8% respectively, but they are still restrained. 
Table 1 shows the effects on prices (market prices) which are not significant, except 
again for hotels and restaurants, that increase their prices by 3.5%, and an overall rise 
in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) of 0.5%. Percentage price changes are calculated as 
relative changes with respect to the numeraire (international prices in our model, 
which are constant). 
 
When looking to the sectoral effects in Table 1, it is easy to see that there are only 
noteworthy impacts on the activity of hotels, restaurants and similar services with a 
reduction equal to -2.9%. As a result, there would be an important direct effect on 
employment, that drops in that sector by around -3.3%. There are also indirect effects 
that could not have been anticipated previously to this analysis and come from the 
important demand by hotels and restaurants to other sectors. Thus there are negative   14
but moderate impacts in the production of food and construction (-0.2%). The 
improvement in the activity of sectors like manufactures should be linked instead to 
the rebate of revenues from the tax reform to the households. 
 
Despite the disparity between the main economic effects of a tourist tax on lodging and 
a moderate rise on VAT rates, the impact on non-residents is quite similar (see Table 
2). The consumption of goods and services by non-resident falls by -1.4% 
approximately, whereas there is a drop in the expenditure made at hotel and 
restaurants by -4.7%. As a result, non-resident consumers reduce their total 
expenditure in Spain by -3.2% in response to the 2.0% increase in the prices of their 
consumption basket.  
 
 
5.3. Effects of an ambitious reform on VAT rates 
 
Finally, an ambitious increase in VAT applied to hotels, restaurants and similar 
services is simulated through the increase of tax rates by approximately 129% from 
the current reduced tax rate (7%) to the general tax rate (16%). In this case, the 
results show without any doubt that this reform will have significant effects on the 
economy and also on tourism. This is obviously intuitive, but it illustrates the effects 
of a homogeneous indirect tax treatment of tourism activities.  
 
In this sense, the Spanish GDP will drop -0.48% at market prices and thus there is a 
progressive increase in the cost of this reform with respect to the moderate rise in VAT 
rates as a 33% increase in VAT rates doubles the costs. This information should be 
taken into account by policy makers and tourism managers to prevent 
disproportionate tax increases on that sector, although the effects on employment and 
capital or labor income are comparable to those obtained from the moderate reform. 
 
The sectoral effects of both VAT reforms are alike in qualitative terms as it is shown 
in Table 1. Moreover, the CPI experiences a notable increase that is caused mainly by   15
a rise on the prices of services provided by hotels and restaurants. The outcome of this 
reform is thereby a substantial negative impact on non-resident tourism. The 
consumption of goods and services by non-resident falls significantly, especially in the 
case of expenses in hotels and restaurants.  
 
 
5.4. Policy implications 
 
To summarize, the tourist tax on lodging considered in this paper has limited effects 
on tourism from abroad and on the economy as a whole, except for hotel and 
restaurant services. Yet a similar and more modest initiative, the Balearic ecotasa, 
raised a strong opposition among the tourism local sector and foreign tour operators. 
That circumstance originated a significant policy constraint as tour operators could 
react by moving their business to other Mediterranean countries. Indeed, perhaps that 
is one of the reasons why the ecotasa was removed after only two years of application. 
 
At the same time it can not be denied that reduced VAT rates on hotels and 
restaurants, where tourists have an important contribution to their activity, represent 
an implicit subsidy to these sectors in Spain. This contrasts with the desire expressed 
by different governments to increase tax revenues from these sectors and it also raises 
doubts on the neutrality and efficiency of indirect taxation. In fact, from an economic 
point of view, it is more sensible to raise VAT rates on hotels and restaurants to grant 
a similar tax treatment across the economy than to introduce specific taxes on 
tourists, which by themselves could affect the efficiency, neutrality and justice of the 
tax system. 
 
Interestingly, a moderate increase in VAT tax rates on hotels and restaurants from 7% 
to 12% will lead to the same effects on tourist expenditures than the specific tax on 
lodging. The effects on the economy as a whole will be very similar too, although the 
VAT change will be more inflationary because of the change in consumer prices for 
hotels and restaurants. The subsequent reduction in economic activity is also   16
understandable in view of the larger group of taxpayers (not only non-residents) but, 
as indicated above, the wider tax scope is the guarantee for more efficiency and 
neutrality.  
 
Finally, an ambitious increase in VAT rates on hotels and restaurants from 7% to 16% 
(the general tax rate) will create important costs for the economy that could make that 
reform politically infeasible. It will considerably raise the price index for non-residents 
who will consequently reduce their expenditure which, together with the internal 
induced effects, will affect hotels and restaurants to a large extent. In fact, costs in 
terms of GDP and inflation will be almost double with respect to the moderate 
increase in VAT rates. 
 
After showing the economic and environmental reasons that justify specific taxes on 
tourism activities, the main message from this study to policy makers and tourism 
managers is that their effects are not significant for the economy in general and for 
tourism activities in particular (at least when the economy is not highly dependent of 
these sectors). However, they may introduce important distortions in the economy and 
bad practices such as black markets to avoid the tax. Furthermore, they are usually 
seen as unfair and against this sector, thus raising important opposition among 
managers and tour operators. 
 
A tax reform that raises VAT on these activities to the standard rate could be better 
understood in the first place. Moreover, a tax reform like that will be also fairer by 
reducing the preferential tax treatment to specific sectors in the economy and 
therefore more neutral from an economic point of view, thus helping to improve the 
efficiency by eliminating distortions in the behavior of agents. In sum, we feel that 
there are clear advantages from the use of this policy approach in the taxation of 
tourism.   
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6. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have referred to the foundations of tourism taxation, as well as to the 
design and results of the hypothetical introduction of two tourism taxes in Spain. At 
least three reasons for taxing tourism were mentioned: it obtains public receipts in an 
efficient way (in terms of tax reform), it covers the conventional costs that arise 
because of tourists, and it can correct the negative external (mainly environmental) 
effects caused by tourism. There are different alternatives to tax tourist activities in 
order to achieve these objectives. The most common way is through conventional 
general taxation, although specific taxation is also possible normally in the form of a 
tax on lodging. 
 
After briefly analyzing the situation of tourism taxation in Spain, mainly through a 
brief description of the now-repealed Balearic ecotasa, the effects of two hypothetical 
taxes with effects on tourism-related sectors were simulated with a AGEM for the 
Spanish economy: a lodging tax equal to 10% of the room rate and a rise in VAT rates 
on hotels, restaurants and similar services. It should be noted that the VAT rise 
affects all consumers in the economy, whereas the specific tax on lodging only affects 
to non-resident consumers directly. The results show that both the tax on lodging and 
a moderate VAT rise (from 7% to 12%) have similar effects, with minor changes in all 
sectors except hotels and restaurants. Finally, the economic effects of a VAT rise to 
16% are much greater, so its implementation is likely to be unfeasible. 
 
From a political economy point of view, it was suggested that specific taxes introduce 
important distortions in the economy and bad practices such as informal markets to 
avoid the tax. Furthermore they are usually seen as unfair towards the sector and 
generate strong opposition among tourism managers and tour operators. However, a 
tax reform that raises VAT rates on tourism activities to the average or near it could 
be better understood and improves the efficiency, neutrality and justice of the tax 
system. Nevertheless, policy makers should still be cautious: radical and sudden tax   18
reforms could be negative for the tourism sector and for those economies highly 
dependent on them.  
 
Recapitulating, this paper should be taken as one of the first attempts within an 
applied general equilibrium framework to evaluate the effects of tourism taxation in a 
developed economy where tourism is relevant. There remain some relevant 
limitations, particularly the low degree of disaggregation of tourism activities in our 
model. It would be also desirable to disaggregate other sectors closely linked to tourist 
activities, such as transport services. Although these and other aspects should be 
addressed in future research, we believe that this article has provided some 
interesting policy insights into the use of taxes on tourism.   19
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Appendix: A more technical description of the AGEM 
 
There are 17 price-takers productive sectors (and commodities) that minimize cost 
subject to constant returns to scale (therefore, null benefits at the equilibrium). The 
production function is a succession of nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
functions as illustrated in Figure A1. As usual in AGEMs, total production in sector i 
is a combination through a Leontief function of intermediate inputs and a composite 
good made up by capital, labor and different energies.  
 
We follow the Armington approach to model international trade of goods. Imported 
products are imperfect substitutes of national production. Therefore the total supply of 
goods and services in the economy is a combination of production from different origins 
by means of a CES function. Maximization of benefits by each sector, determined via a 
constant elasticity of transformation (CET) function, allocates the supply of goods and 
services between the export market and domestic consumption. Since the Spanish 
economy is small and most commodity trade is made with EMU countries, there is not 
an exchange rate (it is fixed) and all agents face exogenous world prices5.  
 
Capital supply is inelastic (exogenously distributed between institutions), perfectly 
mobile between sectors, but immobile internationally. The model assumes a 
competitive labor market and therefore an economy without involuntary 
unemployment. The labor supply provided by households to maximize utility is also 
perfectly mobile between sectors but immobile internationally.  
 
The public sector collects direct taxes (income taxes from households, and wage taxes 
from households and sectors) and indirect taxes (from production and consumption). 
Endowment of capital for the government (KG), transfers with other institutions (TRG) 
and public deficit (DP) are exogenous variables. The consumption of goods and services 
                                                           
5 We assume that the policy simulated has no significant impact on the euro exchange rate due to the relatively small 
impact on the Spanish economy, and also to the fact that Spain's major business partners are countries which belong to the 
European Monetary Union (they account for respectively 73% and 64% of Spanish exports and imports in 2004). 
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(DiG) by the government is determined by a Cobb-Douglas function, where PDi stands 
for domestic prices. Therefore, total public expenditure, capital income (where r is the 
price for capital services) and tax revenues (REV) have to be balanced in order to 
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=
=⋅ + + − ⋅ ∑       ( 1 )  
 
The representative household has a fixed endowment of time which allocates between 
leisure (LS) and labor supply. They maximize utility (W) which is a function of leisure 

















      ( 2 )  
 
It is assumed that consumers have a constant marginal propensity to save which is a 
function of disposable income (YH). The later is equal to the sum of capital income, 
plus labor income (w is the nominal wage and SCH stands for social contributions or 
labor taxes), plus transfers (TR), minus income taxes (TH is the tax rate). Consumption 
of goods and services is defined by a nested CES functions as shown in Figure A2, with 
special attention being paid to the consumption of energy goods. An important 
contribution of the AGEM is the distinction between energy for the house, energy for 
private transport and other products.  
 
() () 11 ( ) HH HH H YT r K w S C T I M E L S T R ⎡⎤ =− ⋅ + − ⋅ − + ⎣⎦      (3) 
 
The AGEM represents a structural model based on the Walrasian concept of 
equilibrium. Therefore for each simulated policy the model must found a set of prices 
and quantities in order to clear up all markets (capital7, labor and commodities). Total 
                                                           
6 σUB is the elasticity of substitution and SUB is the share parameter for leisure on welfare. 
7 There is no quantity adjustments in total supply of capital in the economy because the capital 
endowment between institutions is an exogenous variable. There are only changes in the utilization of   23
savings (SAVINGS) in the economy is defined endogenously and equal to the sum of 
savings made by each one of the institutions. The macroeconomic equilibrium of the 
model is determined by the exogenous financing capacity/need of the economy with the 
foreign sector (CAPNEC). That is the difference between national savings, public 
deficit and national investment. The latter is an aggregated good by means of a 







SAVINGS DP PD INV CAPNEC
=
+− ⋅ = ∑     (4) 
 
International prices PXMi, transfers between the foreign sector and other institutions 
are exogenous variables. Therefore exports (EXPi), imports (IMPi) and the 
consumption of goods and services in Spain by foreigners (DiRM)8 have to be balanced 
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capital between sectors. The equilibrium condition is attained through changes in the price of capital 
services (r). 
8 The elasticity of substitution between different goods is unitarian (a Cobb-Douglas function), whereas 
the elasticity of total expenditure by non residents in Spain was calibrated to be -1.73 following 
estimations by Lozano, Morales and Navarro (2000) for Andalusia, one of the most important Spanish 
tourist regions.   24
 
Figure A1. Chained production technology structure 
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SIOT 1995 Code 
AGRICULTURE  Agriculture, livestock and game, silviculture, fishing and aquiculture   SIOT 01, 02, 03 
COAL  Extraction and agglomeration of anthracite, coal, lignite and peat  SIOT 04
OIL 
Extraction of crude oil and natural gas. Extraction of uranium and 
thorium minerals   SIOT 05
MNER  Extraction of metallic, non-metallic nor energetic minerals    SIOT 06, 07
REFINED OIL  Coke, refined oil products and treatment of nuclear fuels   SIOT 08
ELECTRICITY  Electricity  SIOT 09
NATURAL GAS  Natural gas  SIOT 10
FOOD  Food and drink  SIOT 12-15
MANUFACTURES  Other manufacturing industries  SIOT 11, 16-20, 31-38
CHEMICAL  Chemical industry  SIOT 21-24
MINERAL PROD.  Manufacturing of other non-metallic minerals, recycling  SIOT 25-28, 39
METAL PROD.  Metallurgy, metallic products   SIOT 29, 30
CONSTRUCTION  Construction  SIOT 40
SERVICES 1 
Telecommunications, financial services, real estate, rent, computing, 
RD, professional services, business associations.   SIOT 41-43, 50-58, 71
HOTEL & REST.  Hotel and restaurant trade  SIOT 44




Education, health, veterinary and social services, sanitation, leisure, 
culture, sports, public administrations 
 
SIOT 59-70
Source: Own calculations. The Symmetric Input Output Table (SIOT) codes describe the different areas of 




Table A2. Goods and services purchased by non residents in Spain in the 







AGRICULTURE, COAL, OIL, MNER, REFINED OIL, 
ELECTRICITY, NATURAL GAS, FOOD, MANUFACTURES, 





Housing rental SERVICES 1 
Vehicle rental
Hotel services
HOTEL & RESTAURANTS 
Restaurant services
Passenger transport





Cultural, sport and other leisure services
 
Source: Own calculations. Satellite Accounts of Tourism (SAT-96) are published in INE (2001). 
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